STASZEWSKI (DO NOT DELETE)

10/22/2013 2:11 PM

Contestatory Democracy and the Interpretation of
Popular Initiatives
Glen Staszewski*
I. INTRODUCTION
The ballot initiative process is theoretically interesting and
increasingly important for a variety of reasons. This Essay focuses on
the question of how successful ballot measures should be interpreted
when disputes arise regarding their meaning or scope. For example,
does an initiative, which provides that “the union of one man and
one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a
1
marriage or similar union for any purpose,” prohibit public
employers from providing domestic partnership benefits to their gay
2
and lesbian employees?
I rely on recent insights from civic
republican theory to argue that the interpretation of popular
initiatives should be understood as a form of contestatory democracy.
This vision of statutory interpretation demonstrates the need to adopt
certain substantive canons or structural reforms, which would
promote freedom as non-domination and thereby improve the
democratic legitimacy of the ballot initiative process.
II. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF POPULAR INITIATIVES
In the leading law review article on this topic, Professor Jane
Schacter demonstrated that when courts interpret successful
* The A.J. Thomas Faculty Scholar, Associate Dean for Research, and Professor
of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Portions of this Essay are drawn
from my previous work on direct democracy and statutory interpretation, including:
Statutory Interpretation As Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 (2013); The
Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17 (2006); and Rejecting the Myth
of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV.
395 (2003). I am grateful to Lauren Repole and the Seton Hall Law Review for
inviting me to participate in the 2012 Seton Hall Law Review Symposium and for
their outstanding hospitality. I would also like to thank Michael Sant’Ambrogio for
providing insightful comments on an earlier draft. Finally, I would like to thank
Kathryn Hespe for helpful research assistance.
1
See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
2
See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich.
2008) (resolving this issue).
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initiatives, they typically apply the same “intentionalist” methodology
3
that is traditionally used to interpret ordinary legislation. Instead of
ascertaining the intent of a legislature, however, courts purport to
ascertain the intent of the voters in the ballot initiative context.
Schacter also demonstrated that when courts ascertain the intent of
the voters, they rely almost exclusively on formal legal sources of
meaning, including the language of a ballot measure, the language of
related statutes, canons of statutory construction, legal precedent,
and information from ballot pamphlets, which is sometimes used as a
4
substitute for legislative history. Meanwhile, courts routinely ignore
media accounts and advertising as potential sources of voter intent,
despite social science literature suggesting that those sources are
5
most likely to influence the positions of voters in ballot campaigns.
Schacter pointed out that this approach to the interpretation of
popular initiatives results in a paradox, because “the hierarchy of
interpretive sources that courts consult in the asserted service of
locating popular intent is roughly inverse to the hierarchy of
informational sources that voters consult most regularly in ballot
6
campaigns.”
Professor Schacter also explained that a judicial inquiry into the
popular intent of the electorate will frequently be an exercise in
futility for a variety of reasons. First, the widely recognized problems
of intentionalism in ordinary statutory interpretation are magnified
7
in the context of popular initiatives. For example, even if individual
voters formulated an ascertainable intent on the detailed questions of
interpretation that are typically presented to courts, the judiciary
simply could not cumulate what might be millions of voter intentions
8
on an issue. Similarly, while it might be reasonable to assume that
elected legislators have some detailed knowledge of the intended
meaning of newly enacted statutes, many of the specific legal
consequences of popular initiatives are systematically unforeseeable

3

See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 117–19 (1995); see also Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth
of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV.
395, 406–11 (2003) (summarizing Schacter’s groundbreaking research, and citing
the work of other scholars who subsequently made similar findings).
4
See Schacter, supra note 3, at 119–23.
5
See id.; see also id. at 131–38 (canvassing social science research regarding
influences on voter behavior in ballot elections).
6
Id. at 130.
7
See id. at 124–26.
8
See id. at 124–25.
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9

to the electorate. Voters generally lack any “detailed knowledge of
10
Moreover,
the legal context surrounding a proposed initiative.”
voters are often unfamiliar with the technical language that is used in
11
the text of proposed ballot measures.
Indeed, a wide range of
empirical evidence suggests that many voters do not even read, much
12
less understand, the text of proposed ballot measures.
Unlike the voters, the initiative proponents, who draft proposed
ballot measures and campaign for their enactment, are routinely
capable of researching, understanding, and even partially controlling
the formal legal sources used by courts to interpret successful ballot
13
initiatives.
The overwhelming influence of these unelected and
largely unaccountable initiative sponsors would only be exacerbated
if courts discarded intentionalism in favor of the other leading
14
interpretive methodologies in this context. Thus, strict textualism
and its reliance on the “plain meaning” of an enactment would seem
particularly unjustifiable when it is well established that most voters
do not read or fully comprehend the language of initiative
measures—which are often ambiguously drafted in the first place
15
(and sometimes strategically so). To the extent that textualism is
9

See id. at 127–28.
See Schacter, supra note 3, at 128.
11
See id. at 127–28.
12
See id. at 139–40 and nn.136–44; see also Staszewski, supra note 3, at 408 and
n.53 (collecting sources).
13
See Schacter, supra note 3, at 128–30; Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in
Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17, 47–48 (2006); Staszewski, supra note 3, at 432–
35; see also Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct
Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 519 (“Unlike the electorate as a whole, many
of the active participants . . . are frequent ‘players’ in the repeat game of direct
democracy [who can be expected to pay attention to judicial decisions].”); Elizabeth
Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 17, 30 (1997) (“[B]allot
proposals are drafted by repeat players who can learn the rules of statutory
interpretation and behave accordingly.”).
14
Staszewski, supra note 13, at 48.
15
See Frickey, supra note 13, at 481 (“For a variety of reasons, direct democracy is
probably more likely than legislative lawmaking to produce ambiguous statutory
text.”); Elisabeth R. Gerber, et al., When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter
Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement, 66 J. OF POL. 43, 58 (2004)
(arguing that the “realities of the initiative process often render some degree of
vagueness inevitable,” partly because “some initiative proponents do not have
enough information to write detailed implementation instructions,” and partly
because “appealing to broad principles rather than specific policy changes may be
seen as a better way to cultivate an electoral majority”); Schacter, supra note 3, at
149–50 (explaining that the “animating, yet often untenable, idea that there is a
single ordinary or plain meaning” is especially problematic in the ballot initiative
context).
10
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justified by a desire to respect the compromises or deals that are
facilitated by the federal constitutional structure and its requirements
16
of bicameralism and presentment, there would be no reason to
extend its application to a lawmaking process where those safeguards
17
are deliberately omitted. The same consideration would undermine
heavy reliance on purposivism in this context because this approach
to statutory interpretation is based largely on optimistic assumptions
of coherent action by elected representatives in an ongoing
deliberative process, which cannot plausibly be extended to the oneshot process of direct decision making on a single subject by the
18
electorate.
In addition, routinely construing ambiguity in a
generous fashion to promote an initiative’s broad underlying purpose
would further privilege the intentions of the initiative proponents,
and potentially lead to collateral consequences that were never
intended by the voters and perhaps other more egregious forms of
19
manipulation.
At the end of the day, the leading foundational
theories of statutory interpretation simply do not translate well to the
initiative context.
III. THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
We therefore need to develop a different way of thinking about
20
statutory interpretation in the ballot initiative context. In so doing,
it is useful to keep in mind precisely why the foundational theories
fall short, and to adopt an alternative approach that will ameliorate
those difficulties.
The traditional understanding of statutory
interpretation is that the judiciary should serve as a faithful agent of
21
the legislature. As “honest agents of the political branches,” courts
16

See generally John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001).
17
Staszewski, supra note 13, at 48.
18
Id.; see also Frickey, supra note 13, at 486–87; Garrett, supra note 13, at 32–33.
19
Staszewski, supra note 13, at 48; see also Schacter, supra note 3, at 158–59
(recognizing that “a broad-purpose approach” could encourage “abuse of the
initiative process” and that an appropriate rule of narrow construction “would
reduce the incentives for initiative proponents to draft long, intricate, and
ambiguous laws, the complexity of which can effectively be shrouded by slogans and
soundbites”).
20
This Part draws heavily from my previous work on statutory interpretation
theory, which was recently published in the William and Mary Law Review. See Glen
Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation As Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221
(2013).
21
See Manning, supra note 16, at 5; Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing
Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594–95, 599–
603 (1995).
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22

“carry out decisions they do not make.”
Because statutory
interpretation allegedly implements previous decisions by an elected
legislature, and does not involve creative policymaking by courts, the
enterprise is consistent with, and, indeed, affirmatively facilitates
23
majoritarian democracy.
From this perspective, the democratic
pedigree of statutory interpretation is impeccable, because elected
officials who are politically accountable to the voters are making all of
the important policy decisions. While the dominant understanding
of the best interpretive strategy for a faithful agent of the legislature
has gradually shifted over the years in response to prevailing
understandings of law and the legislative process, the leading
approaches to statutory interpretation all achieve their democratic
legitimacy based on the notion that courts are merely implementing
24
the legislature’s policy decisions.
The traditional view of the democratic legitimacy of statutory
25
interpretation has been difficult to sustain for a variety of reasons.
First, the legal realist movement and contemporary theories of
interpretation have highlighted the inherent ambiguity of language
26
and the severe limitations on legislative foresight. It is therefore
widely accepted that the legislature does not resolve every issue that
arises in statutory interpretation, and that courts have considerable
interpretive leeway. Second, the rise of the modern regulatory state
has resulted in widespread delegations of broad discretionary
authority from the legislature to other institutions, and a candid
recognition that resolving ambiguities in federal regulatory statutes
27
necessarily involves policymaking. Third, recent developments in
political science have undermined the optimistic pluralistic
conception of the legislative process that underlay the traditional
model, and called into question the capacity of voters to hold elected
28
officials accountable for their policy decisions. These developments
raise serious questions about the cogency of faithful agent theory,
and suggest that the democratic legitimacy of statutory interpretation
22

Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 60 (1984).
23
See Staszewski, supra note 20, at 231 (describing faithful agent theory).
24
See id. at 231–39.
25
Id. at 223–24; see also id. at 231–39 (describing the “countermajoritarian
difficulty in statutory interpretation”).
26
See Schacter, supra note 21, at 599–603.
27
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
28
See Schacter, supra note 21, at 603–06.
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can no longer be taken for granted.
Similarly, courts may appear at first glance to be acting in a
democratically legitimate fashion when they interpret successful
ballot measures by ascertaining the intent of the voters. It turns out,
however, that “voter intent” frequently does not exist, and courts
29
therefore cannot be acting as faithful agents of the electorate.
Rather, the judiciary is either privileging the intentions of initiative
proponents, or perhaps implementing its own policy preferences.
Either way, the judiciary’s authority to interpret popular initiatives in
hard cases raises serious questions of democratic legitimacy, which
are at least as severe as the difficulties that arise when courts exercise
policymaking discretion in the course of interpreting ordinary
statutes. In other words, the judiciary’s interpretation of successful
ballot measures routinely presents the same “countermajoritarian
difficulty” that arises whenever lawmakers have not explicitly resolved
the precise question at issue, and courts are therefore compelled to
make policy choices during the course of statutory interpretation.
I have previously argued that the countermajoritarian difficulty
in statutory interpretation can be resolved by applying recent insights
from civic republican theory to the adjudication of statutory disputes
30
in the modern regulatory state.
From a republican perspective,
freedom consists of the absence of the potential for arbitrary
domination, and democracy should therefore include both electoral
31
and contestatory dimensions. In my view, statutory interpretation in
the modern regulatory state is best understood as a mechanism of
32
contestatory democracy. The remainder of this Essay claims that my
proposed understanding of statutory interpretation is even more
compelling in the ballot initiative context, and that this theory
suggests the adoption of certain substantive canons of statutory
interpretation or structural reforms that would promote freedom as
non-domination and thereby improve the democratic legitimacy of
the ballot initiative process.

29

See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
See Staszewski, supra note 20.
31
See Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in
DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 164 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cardón eds., 1999).
32
See Staszewski, supra note 20.
30
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My proposed understanding of statutory interpretation draws on
recent literature in democratic theory, which provides an alternative
to the liberal conception of liberty as non-interference, and identifies the
33
two essential dimensions of democracy. Specifically, Philip Pettit
has articulated a republican conception of liberty as non-domination,
whereby freedom consists of the absence of the possibility of arbitrary
34
domination by others. While government promotes liberty under
this view by protecting citizens from the possibility of arbitrary
domination by private parties, the government can also be a potential
source of arbitrary domination. It is therefore essential for any
government that values liberty to provide safeguards to limit the
possibility of arbitrary domination by the state. Pettit claims that a
republican democracy with two essential dimensions is the form of
government that is most conducive to this understanding of
35
freedom.
Pettit explains that limiting arbitrary governmental action
requires mechanisms to prevent public officials from ignoring the
interests and perspectives of ordinary people, and that this argues in
36
favor of the electoral dimension of democracy. Periodic elections bring
government under the control of the people in the sense that voters
are empowered to select candidates for office based on their
likelihood of promoting the collective interests of the people. The
republican argument for elections is simply that they provide a
sensible way to force government to advance the common, perceived
interests of citizens, and thereby provide a check against arbitrary
domination by the state.
Pettit recognizes, however, that elections can only provide a
limited protection against the possibility of arbitrary domination,
because electoral democracy is not necessarily responsive to the
37
interests and perspectives of minorities.
Indeed, “it is quite
consistent with electoral democracy that government should only
track the perceived interests of a majority, absolute or relative, on any
issue and that it should have a dominating aspect from the point of
38
view of others.” For this reason, republican theorists have always
33

Id. at 225–27, 240–45 (describing the relevant aspects of Pettit’s theory).
See generally PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENT (1997).
35
See Pettit, supra note 31.
36
See id. at 173; see also Staszewski, supra note 20, at 242 (describing this aspect of
Pettit’s theory).
37
See Pettit, supra note 31, at 173–78.
38
Id. at 174.
34
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been concerned about providing structural safeguards to prevent the
39
“The elimination of domination would
tyranny of the majority.
require, not just that the people considered collectively cannot be
ignored by government, but also that people considered severally or
40
distributively cannot be ignored either.”
Pettit therefore considers “whether there is any way of subjecting
government to a mode of distributive or minority control in order to
balance the electorally established mode of collective or majority
41
control.”
The most obvious solution is a procedure that would
enable minorities to question public decisions on the basis of their
perceived interests, and to trigger a review in an impartial forum
where all “relevant interests are taken equally into account and only
42
impartially supported decisions are upheld.” A contestatory regime
of this nature provides citizens with the power to challenge public
decisions on the grounds that their interests and perspectives were
not adequately taken into account during the decision-making
43
process, and the resulting decisions were therefore arbitrary. The
underlying assumption is that the final decision would have been
44
different if such interests were given equal consideration.
Pettit claims that the electoral mode of democracy promotes
legitimacy because it ensures that governmental decisions originate,
45
“however indirectly, in the collective will of the people.”
Significantly, however, the contestatory mode of democracy further
improves the legitimacy of those decisions to the extent that they can
withstand challenges brought by individuals “in forums and under
46
procedures that are acceptable to all concerned.”
Whereas the
electoral mode of democracy “gives the collective people an indirect
power of authorship over the laws,” the contestatory mode of
democracy “would give the people, considered individually, a limited
47
and, of course, indirect power of editorship over those laws.”

39

See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1014–28 (2006)
(setting forth civic republican conceptions of the legislative process, the American
constitutional structure, and the “absurdity doctrine” in statutory interpretation).
40
Pettit, supra note 31, at 178.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 179.
43
See id. at 180.
44
See id.
45
Id.
46
Pettit, supra note 31, at 180.
47
Id. (emphasis added).
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IV. THE TWO ESSENTIAL DIMENSIONS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
This theory of republican democracy helps us to understand
both the value and the shortcomings of direct democracy, and it can
provide us with a different way of thinking about the interpretation of
successful ballot measures. If the election of representatives helps to
prevent the government from ignoring the interests and perspectives
of ordinary people, and thereby “gives the collective people an
48
indirect power of authorship over the laws,” the ballot initiative
process gives ordinary people another, more powerful mechanism for
expressing their views, and theoretically allows “the collective people”
to author the laws directly. In other words, the ballot initiative
process exemplifies the electoral dimension of democracy.
It is important to remember, however, that “it is quite consistent
with electoral democracy that government should only track the
perceived interests of a majority . . . on any issue, and that it should
49
have a dominating aspect from the point of view of others.” Pettit
has therefore emphasized that “[t]he elimination of domination
would require, not just that the people considered collectively cannot
be ignored by government, but also that people considered severally
50
or distributively cannot be ignored either.” For this reason, the
ballot initiative process is in desperate need of mechanisms for
contestatory democracy, which would enable citizens to challenge public
decisions on the grounds that their interests and perspectives were
not adequately taken into account during the decision-making
process, and the resulting decisions were therefore arbitrary.
Judicial review of the constitutionality of successful initiatives
could certainly play this role, and Professor Julian Eule famously
argued that courts should give certain ballot measures a “harder
judicial look” based on the absence of other structural safeguards to
51
prevent majority tyranny in this context. Nonetheless, I want to
suggest that the interpretation of successful ballot measures should
also be understood as a mechanism of contestatory democracy. After
all, when a court decides a case or controversy about the meaning of
a successful initiative, it is essentially resolving a “contest” over the
48

See id.; supra text accompanying note 47 (quoting Pettit).
See Pettit, supra note 31, at 174; supra text accompanying note 38 (quoting
Pettit).
50
See Pettit, supra note 31, at 178; supra text accompanying note 40 (quoting
Pettit).
51
See generally Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503
(1990).
49
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52

permissible scope of governmental authority. Thus, for example,
when a court decides whether an initiative that prohibits same-sex
marriage should also be understood to prohibit public employers
53
from providing domestic partnership benefits, it is essentially
resolving a “contest” over whether the state can revoke the health
care benefits of the members of certain families based on this
enactment. By resolving those contested issues, litigation over the
meaning of successful ballot measures potentially gives the people,
“considered individually, a limited and, of course, indirect power of
54
editorship over those laws.”
55
My sense is that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the
electoral dimension of the ballot initiative process, and the collective
authorship of the laws that are enacted in this fashion, should be
respected by the judiciary and other public officials who should
generally implement the explicit policy choices of the electorate that are
unambiguously established by “the clear text or evident, core purposes”
56
of a popular initiative.
Thus, for example, an initiative which
provides that “the union of one man and one woman in marriage
shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar
57
union for any purpose,” should be understood to prohibit same-sex
marriage and probably civil unions. On the other hand, courts
should adopt substantive canons of statutory interpretation that
narrowly construe ambiguous ballot measures when the potential
collateral consequences of a proposal were not readily apparent to
voters, and the substantive merits of a particular course of action were
therefore not subject to reasoned deliberation, particularly when the
interests or perspectives of the individuals or groups who would be
adversely affected by a proposed understanding of the law were not
considered during the lawmaking process.
Consistent with this approach, Professor Schacter has advocated
the narrow interpretation of ambiguous language when it seems
especially likely that a ballot measure was tainted by the manipulation

52

Cf. Staszewski, supra note 20, at 245–49 (claiming that the interpretation of
ordinary statutes should be understood in this fashion in the modern regulatory
state).
53
See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
54
See Pettit, supra note 31, at 180; supra text accompanying note 47 (quoting
Pettit).
55
This Essay does not take a position on the merits of Eule’s proposal.
56
Frickey, supra note 13, at 522.
57
See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
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58

of “highly organized, concentrated, and well-funded interests . . . .”
Similarly, Professor Philip Frickey has recommended the
establishment of a strong preference for continuity in the ballot
initiative context based on republican principles of government,
whereby “pre-existing law is displaced by the ballot proposition only
when the clear text or evident, core purposes of the electorate so
59
require.” I have previously advocated the adoption of a substantive
canon that would narrowly construe ambiguity in accordance with
60
the campaign statements of initiative proponents. The use of these
canons, in tandem, would alleviate the problem of faction, promote
reasoned deliberation about the details of legislation, and discourage
initiative proponents from seeking to mislead the electorate about
61
the intended consequences of their proposals. As a result, these
substantive canons would promote freedom as non-domination, and
thereby improve the democratic legitimacy of the ballot initiative
process. Incidentally, they would all compel the conclusion that the
initiative prohibiting same-sex marriage should not be interpreted to
prohibit public employers from providing domestic partnership
62
benefits.
V. OTHER POTENTIAL MECHANISMS OF CONTESTATORY DEMOCRACY
We should also not lose sight of the fact that judicial review and
statutory interpretation by courts are not the only potential
mechanisms of contestatory democracy that are available for the
63
ballot initiative process. For example, I have previously suggested
that the same basic structural safeguards that apply to lawmaking by
federal administrative agencies should be adopted in the ballot
58

See Schacter, supra note 3, at 156–61. Professor Schacter also suggested that
courts should encourage deliberation regarding the implementation of direct
democratic measures by making the process of litigating the meaning of ambiguous
ballot measures open to a broader range of perspectives. See id. at 155–56. I pick up
on this intriguing suggestion in the following part of this Essay.
59
Frickey, supra note 13, at 522.
60
See Staszewski, supra note 13, at 45–55.
61
Id. at 50.
62
Compare id. at 50–52 (advocating the application of the foregoing substantive
canons to decide that the proposal does not prohibit public employers from
providing domestic partnership benefits), with Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor
of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008) (holding that domestic partnership benefits
are prohibited by the “plain meaning” of the proposal).
63
See PETTIT, supra note 34, at 295–96 (explaining that “procedural and
consultative measures” during a decision-making process are “two of the three sides
to a contestatory democracy,” and that the third side is the opportunity for ex post
review by an impartial appellate body).
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64

initiative context. Thus, after qualifying a measure for the ballot,
the initiative proponents should be required to provide the general
public with notice of their proposal and an opportunity to submit
written comments and proposed amendments.
The initiative
proponents should be allowed to amend their proposal in response
to any legitimate concerns that arise, but they should also be required
to provide a general statement of the basis and purpose of their final
proposal that explains any major changes, in addition to their
reasoning for rejecting various objections and proposed
amendments. Finally, courts should be authorized to engage in hardlook judicial review of the validity of successful ballot measures under
an arbitrary and capricious standard, which would allow the judiciary
to ascertain whether the initiative proponents engaged in reasoned
65
decision making during the lawmaking process.
By requiring
initiative proponents to consider and respond to the interests and
perspectives of the people who would be adversely affected by their
proposals during the lawmaking process, this structural reform would
limit arbitrary domination by the state and thereby promote freedom
as non-domination.
A related topic that requires more careful consideration in the
scholarly literature on direct democracy is the extent to which the
interpretations of successful ballot measures by administrative
agencies are entitled to deference from the judiciary. My previous
work on statutory interpretation as contestatory democracy
recognized that “agencies are, by necessity, the primary official
66
interpreters of federal statutes” in the modern regulatory state, and
that statutory disputes often involve challenges to the legality of
67
agency action. I have also argued that agencies have a variety of
institutional advantages over courts in statutory interpretation, and
64

See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 447–59; see also Staszewski, supra note 13, at 56
(summarizing this proposal).
65
Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”);
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“[An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious] if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”).
66
See Staszewski, supra note 20, at 254 (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices,
and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57
ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 502–03 (2005)).
67
See id. at 245–47.

STASZEWSKI (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

CONTESTATORY DEMOCRACY

10/22/2013 2:11 PM

1177

that courts should therefore frequently defer to agency decision
68
making. The application of these insights to the ballot initiative
context is seriously complicated, however, by the politics of
69
implementing and enforcing popular initiatives.
In this regard,
political scientists have pointed out that “the people who create and
support winning initiatives are not authorized to implement and to
enforce them,” and that the initiative proponents “must delegate
70
these tasks to legislatures and bureaucrats.”
Moreover, these
scholars have found that successful initiatives are less likely to be
implemented and enforced than ordinary legislation because laws
passed by voters over the objection of legislative majorities or
governors “face powerful post-passage opposition” that is not
71
encountered by legislation enacted by those officials.
The
organizations that sponsor ballot initiatives are further disadvantaged
by the fact that they frequently disband after an election and
therefore cannot easily sanction public officials who decline to
72
implement or enforce their proposals.
While these political dynamics could be viewed as beneficial to
the extent that they prevent ambiguous ballot measures from having
policy consequences that were never intended by the voters, there is
little reason to think that such “non-enforcement decisions” are likely
73
to be transparent or deliberative, and it is troubling for the public
officials who are responsible for implementing popular initiatives to
74
ignore the clear text or evident core purposes of those measures.
The politics of implementing and enforcing popular initiatives could
therefore potentially make it problematic for state courts to give
strong deference to the decisions of state agencies in this context.
Moreover, some state courts do not give state agencies Chevron-style
deference even when state agencies are interpreting or implementing
ordinary statutes that provide them with delegated lawmaking
75
authority. Finally, to the extent that Chevron deference is premised
68

See id. at 258–61.
See Gerber et al., supra note 15; see also GERBER, ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE:
HOW STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY (2001).
70
Gerber, et al., supra note 15, at 44.
71
Id. at 46 (emphasis omitted).
72
See id.
73
Similar problems exist when federal administrative agencies decline to
implement their statutory mandates. See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction
Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369 (2009).
74
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
75
See, e.g., William R. Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a
Proposal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1017 (2006).
69
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on the legislature’s intent to delegate formal lawmaking authority to
76
an administrative agency, it is difficult to believe that the voters could
consciously express such an intent in the ballot initiative context,
regardless of the clarity of the relevant statutory language. I have
found that law students have a hard enough time understanding the
judiciary’s prevailing deference doctrine; to attribute such an
understanding to ordinary voters would take the notion of a legal
77
fiction to a whole new level. Indeed, my sense is that sophisticated
initiative proponents would only delegate formal lawmaking authority
to a state agency if they expected the state agency to be sympathetic
to their policy agenda (in this regard, an initiative could even set up a
78
new state agency to implement a successful ballot measure). If this
intuition is accurate, then the politics of implementing and enforcing
popular initiatives could be overcome, but the application of Chevron
deference to a state agency’s interpretation of a successful ballot
measure would further privilege the intentions of the initiative
proponents in the name of voter intent.
The best solution to this dilemma may be simply to encourage
the state agencies that implement and enforce successful ballot
measures to engage in reasoned deliberation about the best means of
doing so. My preliminary thoughts are that it is typically appropriate
(and sometimes necessary) for initiative proponents to delegate
lawmaking authority to state agencies, which are subsequently
responsible for implementing successful ballot measures. Those
agencies should, in turn, resolve ambiguities about the meaning or
scope of popular initiatives through deliberative procedures, such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking, and their decisions should be
subject to hard-look judicial review. Moreover, it may be worthwhile
for state and local governments to establish independent
commissions, such as the Citizens Initiative Implementation
Oversight Commission (“CIIOC”) proposed by Elizabeth Garrett and
79
Mathew McCubbins, which would have the authority to weigh in on
interpretive controversies before state agencies as well as in court.
The state agencies would thereby provide a forum for contestatory
democracy that would utilize their substantive expertise, while the

76

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Cf. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 267
(2002) (recognizing that resting Chevron deference on Congress’s intent is a fiction).
78
See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dual Path Initiative
Framework, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 299, 334–35 (2007) (providing examples).
79
See id. at 302–03, 332–45 (describing this proposal).
77
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CIIOC would provide additional input and oversight that could
facilitate the consideration of different interests and perspectives and
thereby help to limit the pernicious effects of the politics of initiative
implementation and enforcement. When the decisions of state
agencies are challenged, the judiciary should consider all of the
relevant information and exercise its own independent judgment
regarding the best interpretation of a successful ballot measure, but
courts should give the views of state agencies and the CIIOC respect
80
based on the persuasiveness of their positions.
Finally, the state or local governments that authorize initiative
lawmaking could adopt other structural reforms that would make the
81
interpretive process more deliberative.
Deliberative democratic
theorists, such as James Fishkin and Ethan Leib, have advocated
greater involvement by citizens in lawmaking through the use of
82
techniques such as “deliberative polling” or policymaking juries.
The basic idea is to bring cross-sections of citizens together for a
sufficient period of time to study the relevant issues based on
information provided by experts and political activists with a variety
of different perspectives. After engaging in reasoned deliberation on
the best course of action under the circumstances, the citizen juries
would make recommendations to elected representatives or perhaps
even promulgate statutes or constitutional amendments. My sense is
that we could potentially use deliberative juries of this nature to
supplement the existing ballot initiative process by constituting them to
discuss and resolve the ambiguities that will inevitably arise when the
meaning or scope of successful popular initiatives is subsequently
contested.
While there are many details that would need to be resolved, the
basic idea is to establish a mechanism that would allow (or perhaps
require) courts to refer interpretive problems involving the meaning
or scope of ambiguous ballot measures to a non-partisan commission
that would conduct a “deliberative poll” on the issue. Once an
80

Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (explaining that the
weight of an agency’s “judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control”).
81
See Schacter, supra note 3, at 155–56 (suggesting this possibility).
82
See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2009); ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004) [hereinafter
LEIB, Deliberative Democracy]; Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?,
54 BUFF. L. REV. 903 (2006).
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interpretive problem was referred from the judiciary to the
83
commission, the commission would be required to secure the
participation of approximately five hundred randomly selected
84
citizens to serve on a deliberative jury. The commission would also
be required to provide the “jurors” with briefing materials before the
“interpretive convention,” which would include a statement of the
issues from the court, briefs from the parties to the litigation and
85
various friends of the court, and policy analysis from non-partisan
experts where appropriate. The interpretive convention would begin
with opening statements from the commission about the nature of
the proceedings, followed by opening arguments or reports from the
parties and other drafters of the briefing materials. The jurors would
then be divided into small groups of approximately fifteen citizens
who would engage in reasoned deliberation about the best course of
action on the merits, and prepare questions for the parties or policy
experts that arise from those discussions. The deliberative jury would
reconvene for a second plenary session wherein each small group
would be expected to pose their questions to the parties or
nonpartisan experts. The small groups would then reconvene to
discuss their impressions of the question and answer period and any
remaining issues. The entire group of jurors would then reconvene
for a third plenary session where the parties would present final
arguments and the policy experts could make closing remarks.
Finally, the jurors would be required to cast a vote on their preferred
interpretation of the statute under the circumstances, and to provide

83

For other more fully developed proposals to refer interpretive problems from
courts to lawmaking bodies, see Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s
Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons From Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188
(2012).
84
Cf. FISHKIN, supra note 82, at 24–31 (describing his method of deliberative
polling and explaining that it “was developed explicitly to combine random sampling
with deliberation”); LEIB, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 82, at 12–13, 23–25
(advocating the use of stratified random samples of eligible voters based on Fishkin’s
approach).
85
I anticipate that leave to file amicus briefs would be liberally granted and that
it would be worthwhile for state and local governments to provide public financing to
secure the participation of otherwise unrepresented interests with a significant stake
in the outcome. Cf. Schacter, supra note 3, at 156 (suggesting that “interpretive
litigation” could most effectively ameliorate the shortcomings of the ballot initiative
process “if courts maximized procedural opportunities for participation by a range of
interests” by “liberally granting applications for intervention and amicus curiae
participation” and considering “appointing pro bono representation for
unrepresented, or even unorganized, interests”).
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a written explanation for their final decision.
The commission
would tabulate the results, and provide a proposed decision to the
court in favor of the position that secured a majority of the votes.
While the jury’s recommendation would presumptively bind the
court, the judiciary would have the authority to deviate from the
jury’s proposed decision if the court found that the jury’s verdict was
87
contrary to the great weight of the evidence, and the court provided
a reasoned explanation for its decision. If a lower court declined to
follow the jury’s recommendation on this ground, however, the
court’s decision would be subject to appellate review under an abuse
of discretion standard. My sense is that (frequently elected) state
judges would be under significant pressure to follow the
recommendations of a deliberative jury in this process, but that
courts should nonetheless have the ability to deviate from a
deliberative jury’s decision when necessary to protect against the
tyranny of the majority.
One might wonder why we would rely on deliberative juries to
resolve contests over the meaning or scope of ambiguous ballot
measures, when we would ordinarily rely upon administrative
agencies or courts to resolve statutory ambiguities. Aside from the
shortcomings of statutory interpretation by agencies and courts in the
initiative context that are described above, deliberative juries would
provide the same kinds of advantages that have traditionally been
offered to justify Chevron deference to agencies in the context of
regulatory legislation. In this regard, Professor Fishkin’s deliberative
polls are conducted by using a stratified random sample of citizens in
88
the relevant jurisdiction. He therefore touts the results of the polls
as an accurate reflection of what the people would think about a
problem if they had an opportunity to engage in reasoned
89
deliberation about an issue. From this perspective, the decisions of
a deliberative jury could provide precisely the type of political
86

On the importance of the latter requirement, see, e.g., Glen Staszewski, ReasonGiving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253 (2009).
87
Cf. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 157
(2008) (clarifying “the doctrinal underpinnings of weight-of-the-evidence review,”
and recommending that “courts safeguard the jury-trial right both by increasing the
trial judge’s discretion to grant a new trial on the weight of the evidence and by
requiring a balanced appellate review of decisions granting and denying new trials”).
The court could, of course, also decline to follow a jury’s proposed verdict on the
grounds that it would be unconstitutional. See supra notes 51, 55, and accompanying
text.
88
See FISHKIN, supra note 82, at 24–31.
89
See id. at 28.
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accountability that is thought to be provided by agency decision
making under Chevron. Indeed, this form of political accountability
would be considerably more direct, and thus arguably much stronger,
90
than it is in the agency context.
In addition, if the initiative
proponents knew that any ambiguities in their proposals would
ultimately be resolved by a deliberative jury, it would probably be fair
to say that they have implicitly delegated any subsidiary policy issues
for resolution by such a body. Finally, while the jurors themselves
would not have any particular expertise, they would hear from
experts on the relevant issues during the course of the decisionmaking process. Accordingly, one could argue that all of the
rationales for Chevron deference would be satisfied in this context.
What is perhaps most important from the standpoint of contestatory
democracy—in both agency decision making as well as in the
initiative context—is that there are structural safeguards in place that
encourage or require the decision makers to engage in reasoned
deliberation during the lawmaking process.
While relying upon deliberative juries to resolve contests over
the meaning or scope of ambiguous ballot measures would not be
perfect, it strikes me as substantially better than the current practice
of relying on the pre-political preferences of initiative proponents (or
perhaps judges) to ascertain the alleged “will of the people.” By
resolving interpretive disputes through the use of an impartial forum
where “all interests are taken equally into account and only
91
impartially supported decisions are upheld,” we would be limiting
the possibility of arbitrary domination by the state, and thereby
promoting the only understanding of democracy that is properly
92
connected to the requirements of individual freedom. We would
also be making direct democracy significantly more democratic.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legal scholars have recognized that the dominant theories of
statutory interpretation do not translate well to the ballot initiative
context. Meanwhile, political scientists have pointed out that popular
initiatives are especially likely to contain ambiguities, and there is
often unusually strong political opposition to their implementation
90

For an argument that political accountability is actually quite weak in the
agency context, see, for example, Staszewski, supra note 86, at 1271.
91
See Pettit, supra note 31, at 179; supra text accompanying note 42 (quoting
Pettit).
92
See Pettit, supra note 31, at 184–85.
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and enforcement. Both sets of insights suggest a need for different
ways of thinking about the interpretation and implementation of
successful ballot measures. I have suggested that this project can be
advanced based on recent insights from civic republican theory,
which understand freedom as the absence of the potential for
arbitrary domination, and recognize that democracy should include
both electoral and contestatory dimensions. From this perspective,
the ballot initiative process seems to exemplify the electoral
dimension of democracy. Nonetheless, this form of lawmaking is in
desperate need of mechanisms for contestatory democracy, which
help to ensure that all interests are taken equally into account and
only impartially supported decisions are upheld. I have suggested
that this need can be satisfied by the judiciary’s use of certain
substantive canons of statutory interpretation, or by the adoption of
various structural reforms that would facilitate reasoned deliberation
in the promulgation, implementation, and interpretation of
successful ballot measures. All of these reforms would limit the
potential for arbitrary domination by the state, and they would
thereby improve the democratic legitimacy of the ballot initiative
process.

